Sendero Luminoso, Dias Obscuros: The Shining Path of Peru by Sigrah, Nelson
Western Oregon University 
Digital Commons@WOU 
Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) Department of History 
5-31-2005 
Sendero Luminoso, Dias Obscuros: The Shining Path of Peru 
Nelson Sigrah 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his 










Shi-ning Path of Peru
The history of South America is fiIled with turmoil
and upheaval. Riots, revolutions, and bl-oodshed can be
found in almost every country on the continent if one were
to look hard enough. Some think that this kind of radical-
opposition to forms of government is a thing of the past,
but one need look no further than Peru for proof that
contradicts such a belief. The Sendero Luminoso r or the
Shining Path, is an extremist militant group that has made
their presence known through their actions, and has l-eft a
wave of simul-taneous fear and fascination in their wake.
While the Peruvian government assures its citizens that the
terrorism is a problem that is being dealt with, an even
biqger problem remains; one that enables the Shining Path
to keep on shining. The issue of poverty and the
government's continued position of overlooking the
downtrodden has al-Iowed the Shining Path to gain power, and
until the issue is deal-t with, the Shining Path wil-l- never
be dimmed.
The Shining Path was born in 1,970 in the remote
l-ocation of Ayacucho, high in the Peruvian Andes. Ayacucho
was, and still is, one of the more impoverished sectors of
Peru.1 Partially because of its location, and also because
of its l-ack of resources, the Peruvian government had
ignored Ayacucho long before Abimael Guzman founded the
Shining Path. Wh1le a philosophy professor at the
University of Huamanga, Abimael Guzman first developed his
ideas for the Shining Path after studying the writings of
China's communist leader, Mao Zedong. Guzman, who also qoes
by the name Comrade Gonzalo, was a fiery communist who
bel-ieved that there should be an abol-ition of "the nati-onal-
market economy, industry, the banking system, all- foreign
trade, the use of currency, and the establishment of a
communal village-oriented economy based on a system of
barter exchange. "2 Guzman eventually l-eft his university and
began to recruit young fol-Iowers for his new radical
organization.
Guzman's first recruits were mostly young and poor
Indians. These were easy targets for the Shining Path,
since many of 1ikely had nothing else in their lives.
Initially the Shining Path seemed like another radical-
I Rapoport, David C. Inside Eerrorist Organizations. (New York: Columbj-a
University Press, 1988), 109.
2 Rapoport, 113.
protesting group that. would do no harm, except speak out
against the Peruvj-an government. Then, in !978, the group
disappeared, and many Peruvians bel-ieved that the cul-t had
simply dissolved.3 However, the Shining Path had just gone
into hiding in order to plan their first violent attack.
In l-980, the Shining Path strung together a series of
attacks on polling places in Ayacucho during the
presidential election.a These woul-d be the first documented
attacks by the group, and by 1985, the Shining Path would
be directly responsible for carrying out a total- of 6,158
documented attacks against the Peruvian government.s During
this time, only twice did the Shining Path j-ssue any
wri-tten documents (once in l-981 and again in t982) that
explained who they were and what they wanted. Generally
organizations of this type are more concerned about getting
as much information public as possible, but the Shining
Path belj-eve in the concept of "propaganda by the deed, " or
actions speaking louder than words.6
From 1980 until- L992, Abimael Guzman and the Shining
Path organized violent assaults against the Peruvian
government, recruiting members when they could, and killing












arrested in 1,992, while doing extensive bombings in Lima,
the country's capital, and sentenced to life in pri-son.
When he was interviewed, Guzman said that the Shining Path
was on the brink of victory, and that the Shining Path's
ideoJ-ogy, Gonzal-o Thought, was neari-ng the titl-e of
Gonzalism, a belief that included genocide.T Al-though
l-eader was behind bars, members of the Shining Path
their
continued to wreak havoc. AJ-though the Shining Path is less
prevalent than j-t was in the 1980's, it stiIl remains
responslble for bombings and attacks in Peru today.
In order to understand why the Shining Path has been
able to l-ast for more than three decades, it is imperative
to look at their bel-iefs and members, and why so many
continue to join. The majority of the members of the
Shining Path are of the lower class. But that does not mean
that just because someone i-s poor, they are more 1ike1y to
join in a revol-ution or a violent, radica1 organlzation.
Many scholars do argue, however, that. peasants will
"consider rebellion when they judge their right to
subsistence to be serj-ousl-y threatened."E In the case of
Ayacucho, the malority of the population was poor, and
7 *still Shini-ng After Al-1 These Years." The Economist. Vol 373 Issue
8399 (1-0/30/200a) z 44.
8 Mario Eumerton. "Rondas Campesinas in the Peruvian Civil War: Peasant
Self-defence organisations 1n Ayacucho." BuJ-Letin of Latin American
Research. VoI 20 Issue 4 (Oct2001): 412.
Abimael Guzman preyed upon their fear and jealousy of the
upper class. He painted the qovernment as a greedy and
uncaring entity that worried only about the upper crust of
society. In a sense, he was proven right, when in the mid-
70's, the Peruvj-an government began ignoring l-abor and
peasant orqanizations, and giving preference to business
owners and foreign i-nvestors. At the same time, the
national debt began to rise, and to counteract the negative
effect the government cut urban workers' benefits, ds well-
as their rj-ghts.e Sometimes, after the Shining Path had
passed through a particular town, the Peruvian military
would appear in the town and kiII innocent peasants for
withholding j-nf ormation.lo The
Guzman recruit followers.
The Shining Path was able
government itself was helping
to keep recruj-ts because of
what is cal-led the leader-foll-ower relationship. These
relationships j-ncl-ude four properties: the group leader is
believed to possess unj-que vision and superhuman qualities,
the group leader's views and beliefs are unquestionably
accepted, the group l-eaders orders and carried out also
without query, and the l-eader is given unqualified support
e Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh. "From Revolutionary Dreams to Organizational
Fragmentation: Disputes over Violence within ETA and Sendero Luminoso. "
Terrorism & PoTiticaL VioLence. VoI 14 Issue 4 (Winter2002): 70-7L.
r0 *shining bloodstained path. " New Internationafist. Issue 321
(Mar2000) : 19.
and devot j-on.11 These quallties are ideal- f or a group like
the Shining Path that belj-eves that they are beingr
persecuted or ignored and left to die. A charismatic leader
can appeal to someone who is struggling, and who is in need
of guidance.
The Shining Path al-so initially appealed to the
sympathi-es of those who did not want to join, but who were
questioning the role of government, or who simply felt
sorry for those who were so unfortunate. Members were abl-e
to pass through towns in Peru without fear of being handed
over to the poJ-ice, and sometimes the Shining Path even
repaid some poorer towns with goods that they had taken
from their assaul,ts.12 They also did some grassroots
organiz:-ng in their early stages, including setting up
literacy programs 1n poor Indian vilJ-ages, and preaching
non-violent protest.13
Althouqh the Shining Path itself hol-ds the majority of
the responsj-bility in creating such a radical group, the
Peruvian government aided in more ways than just
aforementioned ones. Initially, the government did not even
recoqnize the Shining Path, blaming the attacks on smal-l
insurgencj-es that would die out quickly. When the Peruvian
1r Rapoport, L1-2-1-1-3.
l2 Fumerton, 4'73.
13 -." Ztrakzadeh, 11-'78.
government captured Guzman, they stopped searching for any
other members, because they believed that by cutting off
the head, the body woul-d die.1a In both instances, the
government underestimated the Shining Path, and Guzman used
this to further show that the government was too busy to
worry about anything that involved the lower cl-ass. In
1990, Alberto Fujimori became dictator of Peru, and
immediateJ-y went after the Shining Path. Although he did
succeed in capturj-nq Guzman, Euji-mori al-so plundered the
nation of its wealth, taking copious amounts of Peru's
money for himself and his friends. This crippled the
economy, and led to infighting in the government and
policing aqencies that were assigned to hunt down the
remaini-ng Shining Path members.ls Today, the Peruvian
government, under the Toledo administration continues to
alienate the lower classes, putting the military in charge
of the majority of Peru's 24 regions, and sometimes
resortj-ng to viol-ence to stop laborers from striking. Both
To1edo and Euj imori also declared that the Shining Path was
dead, and that terrorj-sm was no longer present in Perur 16
even thouqh it is clearly evident.
'o A1"landro W. Sanchez. "The Rebirth of Insurgency in Peru." SmaLf Wars
& Insurgencles. Vol 14 lssue 3 (Autumn2003): 191.
r5 sanchez , L92,l6 sanchez, 18 9 .
Even without the figurehead of the movement, the
Shining Path remains an entity that can still strike fear
into the hearts of Peruvian ci-tizens and especially its
government. Abimael Guzman, with his openly Maoist and
Marxist beliefs, went from being a smal1 college philosophy
professor to a leader and demi-god in one of the most
radical and violent groups in the history of Peru. Although
the Peruvian government still- claj-ms that the Shini-ng Path
is done for good, there remains a small following that wiII
continue to bel-ieve in the Gonza1o Thought, and if the
government continues to act towards poverty and the less
fortunate the way that it has been, it is without question
that the movement wiII rise again, with or without Abimael
Guzman. Although the Peruvian government did not create the
Shining Path, it enabl-ed such a viol-ent group, whether it
was through corruption, passivity, or simply because they
wou1d not address the needs of the working class. Karl- Marx
once said that a revolution would occur as soon as the
lower class got tired of being misrepresented and taken
advantage of by the ruling class, and i-n Peru, the Shining
Path exemplifies his belief.
-t
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